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(i) that all such instruments contain the statement "It is un-
derstood by the grantor5O and the grantees that neither of the
grantees may sell or encumber his own interest in the prop-
erty without the consent of the other grantee, any oral agree-
ment notwithstanding."
(ii) that a brief description of all property held by tenants
by the entirety be filed [with a central filing system easily
accessible to all creditors] identifying the property so held
and stating that the grantees hold as tenants by the entirety.
§ 3b. Failure to meet both the requirements of § 3a(i) and § 3a(ii)
above converts the estate into a joint tenancy with a destructible
right of survivorship. No tenant by the entirety may assert such
tenancy as a defense against an attachment by a creditor if the
tenant held the property in question other than as a tenant by the
entirety at the time the obligation was incurred.
RoNALD W. MooRE
ALCOHOLISM AND ITS SYMPTOMS: CRIME OR DISEASE?
Joe B. Driver was convicted of public intoxication for the first
time when he was 24. He was convicted of the same offense over
200 times in the next 35 years, spending an estimated 2/3 of his life
in jail. Most of those convictions occurred in Durham, North Caro-
lina, under a statute1 making public intoxication a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment. Following at least 3 previous con-
victions in Durham for public intoxication in 1963, Driver was ar-
rested in December, 1963, for the same offense.2 After posting bail
5OThe inclusion of the grantor is to cover such situations as a testator's wish
to devise land to one of his married children.
'N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (1951) provides in part:
If any person shall be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway,
or at any public place or meeting, in any county ... herein named, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as is
provided in this section ....
In 1965 this statute was amended by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (Supp. 1965):
12. In . . . Durham [County] ... by a fine, for the first offense, of
not more than fifty dollars . . ., or imprisonment for not more than thirty
days; for the second offense within a period of twelve months, by a fine
of not more than one hundred dollars .. .or imprisonment for not more
than sixty days; and for the third offense within any twelve months' period
such offense is declared a misdemeanor, punishable as a misdemeanor within
the discretion of the court.
2Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 763 (4th Cir. 1966).
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he was released pending trial, but the next day he was arrested for
being drunk in the Durham County Court House itself. Conviction
for both offenses followed. Those 5 convictions resulted in a 2-year
prison sentence, the maximum allowable under North Carolina law
for a misdemeanor. 3 On appeal the Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed the convictions and sentence in a per curiam decision.
4
Driver's habeas corpus petition to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina5 was denied despite the court's
decision that Driver was a chronic alcoholic.6 The court defined
alcoholic as one who habitually and chronically uses "'alcoholic bev-
erages to the extent that he has lost the power of self-control with
respect to the use of such beverages' "7 and stated that "a chronic
alcoholic is a sick person in need of proper medical, institutional, and
rehabilitative treatment." 8 From this denial Driver appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which reversed the conviction9
on the grounds that Driver lacked the requisite criminal intent and
that the punishment was in violation of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the states.
Driver v. Hinnant,10 citing Morissette v. United States," held that
an "evil intent" or a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was necessary
for Driver to be convicted.12 Morissette is distinguishable because it
dealt with larceny, an offense which requires criminal intent. There
are a number of crimes, however, which have never required a crim-
inal intent.13 Driver's behavior falls into this category and is in the
3N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-3 (1953) provides in part that "all misdemeanors, where
punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors at common
law . . . ." The maximum sentence at common law for a misdemeanor is 2
years. State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130, 4 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1939).
4State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964). What troubled the North
Carolina Supreme Court was that Driver had not been punished directly for
the disease of alcoholism but for succumbing to the disease in public. The
4th Circuit overcame this difficulty by citing the World Health Organization's
definition of alcoholism as "'a chronic illness that manifests itself as a disorder of
behavior.'" Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). This meant that
public intoxication was a symptom of the disease of alcoholism.
5Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
6id. at 97.
71bid. The court adopted the Congressional definition of a chronic alcoholic.
Slbid. The court took judicial notice of this fact.
9Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
'Old. at 764.
11342 US. 246, 250-52 (1952).
12Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 9, at 764.
13Sayre, Public Htelfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933), discusses this in
detail.
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nature of what may be termed "public welfare offenses." 14 This type
of offense, which includes such crimes as illegal sales of intoxicating
liquor,'5 traffic violations,' 6 motor-vehicle law violations,17 and crim-
inal nuisances' 8 has traditionally been penalized without requiring the
criminal intent held necessary by Morissette. Driver's lack of crim-
inal intent should thus have no bearing on the problem since intent
constituted no part of his statutory offense. But Hinnant held that
Driver's misbehavior could not be punished "as a trangression of a
police regulation" that does not require intent as an element of
the crime.' 9 Hinnant neglects to explain why. Perhaps the court
wanted to strengthen its decision by having a ground for reversal in
addition to that of cruel and unusual punishment. Or, the court may
have reasoned that the length of Driver's sentence changed his of-
fense from a public welfare offense, usually punished by light fine or
jail sentence,20 to one requiring criminal intent. Finally, Hinnant may
have meant literally what it said: evil intent is an indispensable ingre-
dient of any crime.21  Requiring criminal intent would virtually
abolish public welfare offenses and other statutory crimes such as
adultery, bigamy,22 or (statutory) rape.23
Hinnant's main reliance appears to be on the Federal Constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted by
'41bid.
15Hill v. State, 19 Ariz. 78, 165 Pac. 326 (1917). See generally Sayre, supra
note 13, at 84-85.
'OCommonwealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N.E. 653 (1918). See generally
Sayre, supra note 13, at 87.
'7 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 252 Mass. 241, 147 N.E. 552 (1925). See generally
Sayre, supra note 13, at 87.
'SState v. Cray, 85 Vt. 99, 81 Ad. 450 (1911). See generally Sayre, supra note
13, at 86.
Driver's behavior would fall under this general category, which includes
"annoyances . . .to the public health, safety, repose or comfort' Sayre, supra
note 13, at 73.
19Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 9, at 764.
2OSayre, supra note 13, at 72, 83.
2 tDriver v. Hinnant, supra note 9, at 765.
22People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956); People v. Spoor, 235
111. 230, 85 N.E. 207 (1908); State v. Sherwood, 68 Vt. 414, 35 Ad. 352 (1896).
See generally Packer, Mere Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Supreme Court
Rev. 107, 149; Sayre, supra note 13, at 74-75.
23Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960); People v. Lewellyn, 314 Ill. 106,
145 N.E. 289 (1924); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (30 Gratt.) 845
(1878).
Some cases have already taken this view. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 39
Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964); State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447, 450 (1859).
See generally Packer, supra note 22, at 146-52; Sayre, supra note 13, at 73-74; 22
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 119 (1965).
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Robinson.v. California.24 Defendant in Robinson had been convicted
under a California statute25 making it a crime to be addicted to the
use of narcotics. All that was required for conviction under the
statute was the defendant's presence in California while addicted to
drugs; it was not necessary to prove that he had used narcotics while
in California. The United States Supreme Court held 6-2 that the
status of drug addiction cannot constitutionally be a crime.26 Five
Justices held that the punishment violated the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally
ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State
might determine that the general health and welfare require that
the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by
compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or se-
questration. But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge,
a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments .... To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is
not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or un-
usual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even
one day in prison ¢would be a cruel and unusual punishment for
the 'crime' of having a common cold.
27
Robinson did not explain why the Eighth Amendment is applicable
to the states or why the punishment therein was cruel and unusual. It
did not discuss the matter of applicability, but assumed that the pro-
hibition was applicable to the states as it is now accepted to be.28
24370 U.S. 660 (1962). Hinnant stated: "Robinson . . . sustains, if not com-
mands, the view we take." Driver v. Hinnant, at 764.
25Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721, reads in part:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the
use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of
a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics.
243Mr. justice Frankfurter did not participate in the decision. Mr. Justice
Stewart wrote the Court's opinion with Justices Black, Brennan, and Mr.
Chief Justice Warren concurring. Justices Douglas and Harlan wrote separate
concurring opinions, Douglas on cruel and unusual punishment grounds and
Harlan on the ground that the punishment was "for a bare desire to commit
a criminal act." Justices White and Clark dissented.27Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 666, 667. (Emphasis added.)
2-8Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1965) (concurring opinion); Driver
v. Hinnapt, 243 F. Supp. 95, 99-100 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Redding v. Pate, 220 F.
1966] ""
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Similarly, Robinson simply assumed that the punishment violated the
standards of the Eighth Amendment.
Prior to Robinson the Supreme Court had specifically held the
Eighth Amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment inap-
plicable to the states.29 Those earlier decisions were questioned in
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber3 ° which assumed, but did not
decide, that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was applicable
to the states.31 Robinson was thus novel in its application of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause to the states.
The Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment was
adopted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights almost verbatim from
the 10th clause of the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.32 But
the scope of the prohibition is not certain. In Wilkerson v. Utah33
the Supreme Court said:
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the
extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to
affirm that punishments of torture... and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden. .... 34
The early ban was undoubtedly aimed at torture and other bar-
barous punishments, 35 but the Supreme Court has recognized that the
Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. IMI. 1963); Staff of Subcomm. On Constitutional Rights,
Senate Comm. On The Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Layman's Guide To
Individual Rights Under The United States Constitution (Comm. Print 1962);
Corwin & Peltason, Understanding the Constitution 138-39 (3d ed. 1965).
290'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72
U.S. (5 Wail.) 475, 479-80 (1866); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250 (1833) (dictum).
See Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 97 & n.8 (E.DIN.C. 1965).
a0329 U.S. 459 (1947).
31id. at 462.32Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Sutherland, Constitutionalism in
America 99 (1965); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 636 (1966). Some authorities
say the origin dates back to the Magna Carta or the Laws of Edward the
Confessor. 34 Minn. L. Rev. 134, 135 (1950).
a399 U.S. 130 (1878).
34M. at 135-36. For a similar view see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
375 (1910).
S5Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Note, 79 -arv. L. Rev. 635,
636-37 (1966).
The prohibition has also been held to include:
a. burning at the stake. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). See
generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635 (1966).
b. crucifixion. In re Kemmler, supra.
See generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra;
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev, supra.
C. breaking on the wheel. In re Kemmler, supra. See generally Robinson
CASE COMMENTS
prohibition "must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth . . . " if the prohibition is "to be vital." 36 Ex
parte Picken3 7 held that the clause "is to be considered in the light
of developing civilization;" it is therefore "not necessary to speculate
as to what might have been considered cruel and inhuman punish-
ment in 1787." 38 Other courts have held that punishment is cruel
and unusual if it "shocks the moral sense of all reasonable men as to
what is right and proper under the circumstances" 9 or is "so exces-
sive as to shock the sense of mankind." 40 In Trop v. Dulles41 the
Supreme Court struck down as cruel and unusual a method of punish-
ment involving no pain or physical hardship: deprivation of citizen-
ship for wartime desertion. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment "is not static": it "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 42
It appears that the true Robinson rationale was that drug addiction
was not a crime and that any punishment for that which is not a crime
is cruel and unusual. Robinson thus limits the state's power to define
what a crime is, which appears to be a matter of substantive due
process. In his dissent Justice White observed that the Court's reason-
ing resembled that of substantive due process.4 3 Other comments on
Robinson have also recognized this and have suggested that a decision
based on substantive due process would have been more rational.
44
Since the statute bore no "rational relation to some legitimate legisla-
v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra; Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev.,
supra.
d. the rack, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892).
See generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra;
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev, supra.
e. the thumbscrew, O'Neil v. Vermont, supra.
See generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra;
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev., supra.
f. quartering, Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Note, 79
Harv. L. Rev., supra at 637.
g. in some circumstances, solitary confinement. See Robinson v. California,
supra note 24, at 675-76.
23Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
37101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951).
3Sd. at 288.
agWeber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946).
40Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir. 1940).
41356 U.S. 86 (1958).
421d. at 100-01.
43Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 689.
44Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 35, at 649; 29 Brooklyn L. Rev. 139, 141
(1963).
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tive end [control of narcotics] i.e., conduct rightfully regulated with-
in the four comers of the police power," it did not comport with
substantive due process.4 5 In other words, to punish as criminal that
which is not criminal violates due process, and, according to Robinson,
also violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Robinson thus creates the problem of determining what is punish-
able as a crime. The Model Penal Code defines a crime as any offense
defined by the Code or by statute for which the death penalty or
imprisonment may be exacted.46 A crime has also been defined as
"any act or omission prohibited by public law for the protection of
the public, and made punishable by the state in a judicial proceeding
in its own name." 47 A crime therefore is simply what the legislature
has made punishable through a criminal proceeding. But this defini-
tion is of no use in determining what acts or omissions the legislature
constitutionally may punish. It seems obvious that if the legislature
passed, for no reason, a Pink Car Law which required all cars to be
painted pink, the law would be held unconstitutional. A law must
bear a rational relation to some legitimate legislative end; the Pink
Car Law would not. It is not so obvious why punishment for drug
addiction or alcoholism or public intoxication of the alcoholic would
be unconstitutional.
Although it was not discussed, Hinnant's reasoning approximates
the Durham Rule for insanity cases: Durham v. United States48 held
that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect." 49 Driver's intoxica-
tion was certainly the product of a disease. Application of the Dur-
ham Rule50 would relieve Driver of criminal responsibility. Even
4529 Brooklyn L. Rev., supra note 44, at 141.
46Model Penal Code § 1.04 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
47Clark & Marshall, Crimes S 2.01 at 79 (6th ed. 1958).
4821t4 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
491d. at 874-75.
50Application of the combination M'Naghten-Irresistible Impulse Test or the
Substantial Capacity Test promulgated by the American Law Institute would yield
the same result.
The M'Naghten Rule was established in Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (1843), and is as follows:
If, because of. . . 'defect of reason,' the defendant did not know what he was
doing he is not guilty of crime.
Even if the defendant knew what he was doing he is not guilty of crime if,
because of this 'defect of reason,' he did not know what he was doing was
wrong. Perkins, Criminal Law 747 (1957).
Thie Ifresistible Impulse Test is that one has an impulse to commit a criminal
act, the actor not being able to overcome or resist the impulse because insanity
CASE COMMENTS
though Driver's physical acts comprised what would normally be a
crime, he lacked culpability and therefore could not be held crim-
inally responsible.5 1 Public intoxication of an alcoholic is therefore,
under the Durham rule, not a crime.
"'[T]he idea of basing treatment for disease on purgatorial acts
and ordeals is an ancient one in medicine'" 52 tracing back to the
Biblical belief that disease represented punishment for sin. The general
belief was that "'relief [from sin] could take the form of a final
heroic act of atonement.' "52a Basis for the belief that intoxication is
a sin may be found in Biblical condemnations of drunkennessPtu Under
early English law drunkenness was punishable by the ecclesiastical courts
as a crime against religion 54 rather than as a common law crime.5 But
if the drunkenness went so far as to constitute a public nuisance, it
was punishable as a common law crime.56 Public intoxication was made
a stautory offense in England in 1606. But since the enactment of
such statutes, advancements in medical and other scientific fields have
invalidated the grounds on which such statutes were based. Generally
alcoholism is viewed today as a disease, not a crime.58 Much has been
or mental disease has destroyed the freedom of his will and his power of self-
control, the actor is relieved of criminal responsibility. See generally Perkins,
supra at 756-63.
The Substantial Capacity Test is:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks either substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
GSPerkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 5.52Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 669.
52aIbid. The quotation continues:
This superstition appears to have given support to fallicious medical rationales
for such procedures as purging, bleeding, induced vomiting, and blistering,
as well as an entire chamber of horrors constituting the early treatment of
mental illness. The latter included a wide assortment of shock techniques, such
as the "water cures" (dousing, ducking, and near drowning), spinning in a
chair, centrifugal swinging, and an early form of electric shock.* All, it
would appear, were planned as means of driving from the body some evil
spirit or to.ic vapor.
[*Reference could be made here to the Salem Witch Trials in the 17th
century. Author's note.]
53Isaiah 5:11; Proverbs 23:31-32; 1 Corinthians 6:10; Ephesians 5:18.
54Perkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 777; 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of England 410 (1883).
5GPerkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 777.
561bid.; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1720 (12th ed. 1932).
575 Jac. 1, c.5 (1606); Perkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 777.
SSAthough alcoholism was generally not recognized as a disease until'relatively
1966]
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done in the past half century to improve penal methods, but little at-
tendon has been paid to the need for updating substantive criminal law.
It has been said that criminal law is "one of the most faithful mirrors
of a given civilization, reflecting the fundamental values on which the
latter rests." 59 When these values change, it is also necessary for
substantive criminal law to change. 60 That is the problem Hinnant
faced. The solution may be civil commitment6 ' to a hospital or a re-
habilitation center for the treatment of the disease, 2
Hinnant leaves questions unanswered and creates new problems.
recently, there is evidence that it was so recognized as early as 1804. See Mc-
Carthy, Alcoholism: Attitudes and Attacks, 1775-1935, 315 Annals 12 (1958).
Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 667 n.8; Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d
761 n.6 (4th Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 97 & n.6 (E.D.N.C.
1965).
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, appendix f, Driver v. Hinnant,
supra; Brief for Appellant, appendix c, Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d
50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Logan, Alcoholism-A Legal Problem?, 36 Dicta 446 (1959); Mann, The Chal-
lenge of Alcoholism, 24 Fed. Prob. 18, 19 (1960); Pinardi, Helping Alcoholic
Criminals, 9 Crime & Delinquency 71 (1963).
59Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law 524 (1962).
6Olbid.
61There is a basic distinction between criminal and civil punishment. This
distinction was recognized in White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.D.C.
1954):
Therefore some of the features of penal institutions resemble those of educa-
tional, industrial and training schools for juvenile delinquents. The basic
function and purpose of penal institutions, however, is punishment as a
deterrent to crime. However broad the different methods of discipline, care
and treatment that are appropriate for individual prisoners according to
age, character, mental condition, and the like, there is a fundamental legal
and practical difference in purpose and technique. Unless the institution is
one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and physical well-
being, unless its facilities are intended for and adapted to guidance, care,
education and training rather than punishment, unless its supervision is
that of a guardian, not that of a prison guard or jailer, it seems clear a
commitment to such institution is by reason of conviction of crime and
cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional safe-
guards.
Benton -v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1956), held that jail is a
"place for punishment of crimes" and to put one there who was prosecuted
under a civil statute would raise "grave constitutional questions."
A similar result was reached in In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470,
476 (1958).
62Alexander, Jail Administration 237 (1957); Guttrmacher & Wiehofen, Psy-
chiatry and The Law 319 (1952); Perkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 781;
Brunner-Orne, The Role of a General Hospital in the Treatment and Rehabilita-
tion of Alcoholics, 19 QJ. of Studies on Alcohol 108, 108-09 (1958); Logan,
supra note 58, at 446-50; MacCormick, Correctional Views on Alcohol, Alco-
holism, and Crime, 9 Crime & Delinquency 15, 18, 27 (1963); Mann, supra note
58; Murtagh, The Derelicts of Skid Row, The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1962, at
